We examine the robustness of networks under attack when the attacker sequentially selects from a number of different attack strategies, each of which removes one node from the network. Network robustness refers to the ability of a network to maintain functionality under attack, and the problem-dependent context implies a number of robustness measures exist. Thus, we analyse four measures: (1) entropy, (2) efficiency, (3) size of largest network component, and suggest to also utilize (4) pairwise connectivity. Six network centrality measures form the set of strategies at the disposal of the attacker. Our study examines the utility of greedy strategy selection versus random strategy selection for each attack, whereas previous studies focused on greedy selection but limited to only one attack strategy. Using a set of common complex network benchmarks in addition to real-world networks, we find that randomly selecting an attack strategy often performs well when the attack strategies are of high quality. We also examine defense against the attacks by adding k edges after each node attack and find that the greedy strategy is most useful in this context. We also observed that a betweenness-based attack often outperforms both random and greedy strategy selection.
Introduction
Network science is providing an increasingly useful context in which to understand a wide range of realworld phenomena, where the network and links correspond to the components of the system and their interactions, respectively [1, 2] . Numerous examples of network models exist, for instance, the Internet (where nodes are computers/routers and the links represent information exchange), the World Wide Web (nodes are web pages and the links are hyperlinks), metabolic networks (nodes are metabolites and the links indicate that the adjacent metabolites take part in the same reaction) and social networks (where nodes are people and the links represent some relationship or interaction between them). One goal of network science is to better understand real-life complex systems by studying the behaviour of their complex network models. In this context, 'complex' indicates the existence of inherent meaning in the network structure, and thus is not a measure of problem complexity or hardness [1] .
One important characteristic of a complex network is its ability to adequately function when its nodes and/or links are removed from the system [3] . Resilience of the whole system to these deleterious and simultaneous attack based on five network centrality measures was studied. Their results indicate that many centrality measures may produce similar results, but that degree or eigenvector centrality may suffice to evaluate worst-case behaviour. They also find that increasing assortativity in the network is beneficial when protecting against targeted attack, but is not the best approach to protect against random failures. Experimental results of [34] consider four centrality measures, while varying the network clustering coefficient and assortativity for both exponential and scale-free networks, and show sequential attack to be much more devastating that a simultaneous one. They focus on robustness of the network giant component as nodes are removed, and also provide analysis on real-world networks. The stability of random scale-free networks to degree-dependent attacks was also examined in [35] , who additionally derive theoretical values for the critical fraction of nodes needed to be removed to ensure the network is destroyed. They also propose defence strategies that focus on adding links to the graph based on node degree. They find adding links to average degree nodes yields the best defence strategy.
To increase realism in the attack Gallos et al. [36] studied resilience of scale-free networks to a number of attack strategies while varying the amount of information available to the attacker about the network structure, with similar findings reported by [37] . Related results of [38] studied how targeting strategies are affected by erroneous data about the network structure using a simulation-based analysis. The findings suggest that even a small amount of appropriately targeted nodes can have a devastating effect on the network, and that the best protection for these nodes is to hide their existence from would be attackers. In this work, we assume full information of the network structure at all times.
Previous investigations of sequential and simultaneous attack assumed the attacker is limited to a single predetermined strategy. However, in many applications the attacker, whether with malicious or benevolent intent, may have the ability to consider several strategies and choose the strategy perceived to have the most significant impact given the current state of the network. This greedy strategy is what forms the focus of our study. We wish to understand whether considering multiple strategies is a useful approach for sequential network attack.
Robustness and centrality
Robustness, the ability of a network to function under node (or link) failure or attack, can be quantified in a number of ways depending on the context being considered. In this paper, we focus on unweighted and undirected networks G = (V , E) that are simple (contain no multilinks or self-loops). We assume that the network is composed of |V | = n nodes and |E| = m links. For simplicity in notation, we assume that G is defined by its adjacency matrix A, where A ij = 1 if the link (i, j) is present in G, and 0 otherwise.
A path between nodes u, v ∈ G, is a cycle-free sequence of links u, . . . , v one would travel if starting at node u and arriving at node v. Since our graphs are assumed unweighted, each link can be thought of as having a unit-weight. Thus, the distance between u and v will be the number of links along a connecting path. Many paths are possible between pairs of nodes, but the most interesting in this context is the geodesic path, which is the smallest number of links between u, v ∈ V . Several shortest paths between nodes u, v may exist.
The removal of a vertex v ∈ V from the graph G will be referred to as an attack on the network. The remaining induced subgraph will thus be G(V \ {v}), where it is implied that any link adjacent to v is also removed from the graph when v is attacked. Upon vertex removal, the graph may split into a number of connected components whereby no path exists between nodes in different components. The component with the largest number of nodes will be made a focus of study. The strategies under consideration by the attacker are well-known centrality measures, which aim to quantify the importance of a node to the network. 
Robustness
Given that robustness can be evaluated in a number of ways, it is prudent to consider different measures and examine whether robustness varies significantly under sequential attacks. We consider four measures of robustness commonly found in literature: entropy, efficiency, largest network component and pairwise connectivity.
Graph entropy
The entropy of the degree distribution has been previously studied by [39] to measure the heterogeneity of complex networks. They find that this perspective is an effective measure to quantify a network's resilience to random failures. Let p(k) be the probability of a node having degree k. For a given graph, it is straightforward to tabulate the number of nodes n k having degree k. Then, the probability of a node having a given degree is p(k) = n k / δ i=0 n i , where δ = max j=1,...,n {d j } is the maximum degree of all nodes in the network. The entropy of the degree distribution will then
The maximum value of this measure occurs when each degree is equally likely, p(k) = p(i) ∀k, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , δ}, resulting in H max = log(δ + 1). If p(k) = 1 for some k, then the graph is regular and all nodes have the same degree, leading to the minimum entropy H min = 0.
Largest component
Another robustness measure is referred to as the R-index [10] , which is the fraction of nodes in the largest component of the graph after removal of i/n proportion of the nodes in G. Let τ be an arbitrary permutation of the n nodes of G, and let τ i indicate the first i elements of τ . Then, the R-index is computed as
is the size of the largest component of G after removal of the first i nodes in τ . This value ranges between 1/n and 0.5, which allows networks of different sizes to be compared. The lower bound of 1/n will be attained when the network under consideration is a star graph, whereas the upper bound of 0.5 will occur if the network is fully connected. We scale the range to [0, 1] in our implementation, but the interpretations remain consistent.
Efficiency
Consider the set Π of geodesic paths between all pairs of nodes u, v ∈ V . Intuitively, a network where pairs of nodes are separated by only a small number of links should be able to quickly transmit information between the nodes. Thus, for |π uv | as the length of the geodesic path between u and v, the network efficiency [40] is defined as ψ(G) = n u,v∈V ,u =v (1/|π uv |), where |π uv | = ∞ if nodes u and v belong to different graph components. To account for the context of network attacks, it was proposed in [41] to modify this measure to include the proportion of nodes removed from the network. Using similar notation as in Section 2.1.2, they define the integral efficiency (hereto referred to solely as efficiency) as
2.1.4 Pairwise connectivity Pairwise connectivity has been proposed as the objective function of an optimization problem having the goal of identifying a small subset of nodes whose deletion yields minimum pairwise connectivity [42] , calculated as 
Centrality measures
As network robustness is problem-dependent, so also are the nodes critical to the proper functioning of the network. The measure of a node importance to the network is captured by its centrality measure. Numerous approaches to quantify the centrality of a node have been proposed (for critical reviews and overview, see [43] [44] [45] ). Figure 1 shows an example network that highlights the result of the most central vertex as identified by each of the six centrality measures described below.
Betweenness centrality
Consider the set Π of geodesic paths between all pairs of nodes u, v ∈ V . The betweenness centrality of an arbitrary node i ∈ V is calculated as the number of paths in Π that contain i. That is, for σ uv (i) as the number of shortest paths between nodes u and v that contain node i, and if σ uv is the total number of shortest paths between u and v, then the betweenness centrality is calculated as u =v =i∈V (σ uv (i)/σ uv ). The underlying goal is to identify nodes that are most critical with respect to their importance in transmitting information between all pairs of nodes in the network. Nodes that act as bridges between groups of nodes will have a high betweenness centrality since communication between pairs of nodes in the different groups must communicate through the bridge provided by the node. The targeting of bridge nodes lends itself well to decreasing robustness by creating many graph components.
Closeness centrality
Let |π iv | be the length of the geodesic path between i, v ∈ V . Residual closeness [46] is computed as v∈V \{i} 2 −|π iv | . Closeness aims to measure centrality by the distance information can spread from a given node to other reachable nodes in the network. The preference is for nodes to be closer to other nodes in the network, meaning information can spread to them quicker.
Degree centrality
One of the more straightforward centrality measures considers only the degree of each node v ∈ V , which quantifies the number of adjacent links of v. The principal conceptual reasoning for the utility of this measure is based on the assumption that nodes with higher degree are more important [47] [48] [49] . 131 2.2.4 PageRank The principle computation behind PageRank centrality is based on the concept of eigenvector centrality and is computed as A = αP + (1 − α)T, where matrix (T ij ) n×n = 1/n captures randomly visiting one of n web pages, and matrix P models random surfing through links of web pages. The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is a user-defined dampening parameter usually equal to 0.85.
Kleinberg's Authority scores
Calculating the hub and authority values for each node can be accomplished by an iterative technique. Computing h i and a i the hub and authority weight for node i is accomplished by h k+1 = (AA )h k and a k+1 = (A A)a k . It is thus evident that if the matrix A represents an undirected graph and is symmetric (as in our context), then the hub and authority scores are equivalent.
2.2.6
Leverage centrality Leverage centrality [28] is a measure of the degree of node i and each of its neighbours, averaged over all its neighbours and is computed according
While leverage centrality is similar to degree-based centrality measures, it is not equivalent and indeed conveys different information. A node having a negative leverage is said to be influenced by its neighbours since they connect and interact with more nodes. Positive leverage centrality thus implies the node in question influences its neighbours as they will have fewer connections.
Hypothesized behaviour
As indicated in Section 1, single-strategy attack has been the subject of a number of studies. We focus on multi-strategy approaches:
(1) Random-multi: At each iteration a centrality measure is randomly chosen and the network is evaluated. The node having the highest centrality is removed and the process is repeated as desired.
(2) Greedy-multi: During each iteration, we compute the highest ranked node for each of the m centrality measures v * m . For each strategy, the effect of removing v * m from G is recorded, i.e. we consider the induced subgraph G(V \ {v * m }) for each strategy. The node having the largest reduction in robustness is removed from the network.
Let Y = {y 1 , . . . , y r } be a set of r vertex selection strategies (i.e. centrality measures) and let j = 1, . . . , z indicate one of z sequential attacks. Then, X y i ,j will represent the vertex selected by strategy y i during the jth attack (we use the notation X i,j as a short-form for convenience). We provide only brief and simple arguments to hypothesized behaviour of the random-and greedy-multi-strategy approaches.
Consider selecting strategies y i with uniform probability for attack j. We can represent the sequence of attacks as a Markov chain having s j recording the selected strategy, leading to the probability of observing a particular attack sequence as
where p(s j | s j−1 ) is a transition probability and p(s 1 ) is the initial probability. Owing to the impact an attack has on subsequent centrality measures and the variety of network structures, accurately ascertaining the transition probabilities will be overly time consuming. An alternative representation of the chain could consider states as all subsets of the given graph, where transition between two states 132 M. VENTRESCA AND D. ALEMAN can only take place if an appropriate attack strategy exists in Y. The remaining non-zero probabilities will also be influenced by network topology. One may study more indepth the impact of particular graph topologies on Equation (3.1), however, that is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, a lower bound on the probability of randomly generating the identical greedy attack sequence can be easily computed by assuming that each vertex is equally likely to be selected as most critical by each strategy on any given attack. Thus, the probability can be computed as the product of continually randomly selecting the identical nodes as chosen by the greedy approach p(random equals greedy)
where Y j is the number of uniquely identified nodes at iteration j when considering all strategies. The randomized approach can potentially construct the optimal decision policy with probability 1 − (1 − p) z , which is essentially sampling with replacement. In contrast, the greedy approach will only yield the optimal policy if at each iteration the greedy choice sequence is optimal.
The centrality measures under consideration, especially betweenness and degree, have been shown to be highly effective for network attacks, especially in tree-like and sparse networks [33] . In general, if the set of centrality measures under consideration is composed of high-quality strategies, then it seems reasonable to expect little difference in output between the random-multi and greedy-multi approaches. In fact, the randomized nature may allow escape from local optima. The six centrality measures described in Section 2.2 typically identify nodes whose removal will largely impact network robustness, and consequently it is expected that in most cases the random-multi and greedy-multi approaches will yield similar results, on average.
Computational results
Our experiments are focused on ascertaining the utility of greedy sequential attacks on networks. To study the effects of such attacks, we utilize three different complex network growth algorithms to create In each experiment, we compare the two multi-strategy approaches highlighted in Section 3, as well as greedy sequential attack by a single centrality strategy whereby each one of the centrality measures in Section 2.2 is independently considered. At iteration i the network is evaluated according to that measure and the highest-ranked node is removed from the network. We present the average result obtained over 50 trials. Our analysis also examines whether a particular strategy is better suited to any of the four robustness measures described in Section 2.1.
Generating benchmark networks
Three types of benchmark networks were considered. The first concentrates on graphs with exponential degree distribution, the second is a preferential attachment-based approach with tunable clustering and the last is an Erdős-Rényi random graph model. Generating a random connected network for the first type of network with a predefined degree sequence can be accomplished via the Monte Carlo-based method proposed in [50] . Thus, we describe the process of generating the required degree sequences and employ [50] to generate the corresponding network. Our results are averaged over 50 trials, where a new network instance is constructed at each iteration.
A scale-free network is one whose degree distribution asymptotically follows a power law, p(k) = k −γ , where γ typically lies in the range (2, 3) . The common belief is that many real-world networks such as social networks, protein-protein interaction networks and the World Wide Web exhibit degree distributions that are sufficiently described by the power law [51] [52] [53] . A power law degree sequence can be generated by sampling n values (corresponding to vertex degrees) with replacement, varying k = 1, . . . , n and some user desired γ . Scale-free networks are known to have poor robustness under targeted attacks, but can be constructed with varying degrees of clustering, which may impact network robustness. We thus employ the construction algorithm of [31] , which is a modification to standard preferential attachment models that enforces the creation of triangle connections in the network. The algorithm requires as parameters the number of nodes (we fix to n = 500), the number of links to add per iteration (fixed at m = 3), and the probability that a triangle is added per iteration versus typical preferential attachment of links (we vary this probability in our experiments from 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75). As described in [31] generated networks will all have a power law exponent of ∼3. Another observed degree distribution is the exponential degree distribution, for instance, in the North American power grid [54] . These networks are similar to scale-free networks, except the degree distribution has a shorter tail. The distribution takes user-defined parameter γ and has degree distribution p(k) = e −γ k . Results are presented for γ ∈ {0.25, 0.45, 0.65}. We also employ the Erdős-Rényi random graph model with n = 500, and consider edge existence with probability 0.007 and 0.02. In total, seven network parametrizations were considered for testing purposes, the average characteristics of each is given in Table 1 . For each network, we calculated the number of links |E|, global clustering coefficient C [2] , average geodesic path length |π|, mean degreeδ and assortativity ρ (preference for nodes to connect to similar nodes), which is computed as the Pearson correlation coefficient of degree between pairs of connected nodes. As these measures indicate, each graph type has different statistical structures.
Correlation between robustness and centrality measures
We first examine the degree of correlation observed between the four measures of robustness described in Section 2.1. We generate a set of connected and disconnected graphs so as to accumulate a variety of network structures for the analysis. Instead, we generate 2000 random graphs [55] using a randomly selected probability p ∈ [0.0013, 0.01] for the existence of an link e ∈ E. That is, each link e exists in the graph with probability p. We restrict the network to contain 500 nodes. In this manner, we generate a set of networks each having a random number of randomly sized graph components. Figure 2 shows the results of the correlation analysis between robustness measures. In all cases, a high degree of correlation (> 0.89) is observed. The relationship between each of the measures seems to follow a predictable structure, although definite differences exist between these robustness measures.
A comparison of the correlation between the six centrality measures is also performed, and shown in Fig. 3 . Each datum is computed simultaneously when analysing robustness, and so the same approach of generating networks with multiple components is used. We generally find very small correlation between these measures on a global scale, although the authority, closeness and degree centrality measures seem to have a strong relationship (> 0.78 correlation). Patterns are discernible in the figure, indicating that the measures may perform similarly on specific types of network topologies. The varied correlation values imply diversity in the options for the sequential attacker at each iteration of the attack. 
Comparing attack strategies on benchmark networks
The first major experiment we conduct compares the random-multi, greedy-multi and greedy-single strategies presented in Section 3. In total, we have eight attacks: the six independently considered centrality measures, along with the random-multi and greedy-multi approaches. Network robustness during sequential attack under each of these strategies is given in Fig. 4 , considering each of the four robustness measures of Section 2.1. As would be expected from the observed correlations in Fig. 2 , the pairwise robustness and largest component measures show similar behaviour under sequential attack. It is already known that betweenness attacks are very efficient in reducing the size of the largest network component [56] . Moreover, betweenness attack is consistently most destructive, even when compared with the multi-strategy approaches with the exception of entropy robustness. A reasonable explanation for the greedy approach not yielding the best results is that the algorithm converges to a local optima that is not of the quality achieved by only betweenness attacks. Early selection of non-betweenness identified nodes are the likely culprit for this deception and consequent performance difference. These four experiments reconfirm the attack vulnerability of scale-free-like networks, under the four different robustness measures. Randomly selecting an attack strategy yields similar performance as greedily selecting a strategy, enforcing the hypothesis that the set of centrality measures being considered is able to identify similarly critical nodes. Moreover, both greedy and random strategy selection did not appear to suffer from 'bad case behaviour' whereby a specific centrality measure may not be appropriate under certain robustness measures. This situation was observed when betweenness centrality was incapable of totally destructing the networks within a small number of sequential attacks and implies that the most useful attacker will consider a variety of strategies for each attack, and should select greedily or on a random basis. In practice, it is highly unlikely that an attacker will be able to employ the greedy-multi approach due to the full network information necessity. However, our results indicate that random strategy selection may perform similarly on average and also has the added benefit of providing little information to the network protector. Figure 5 compares the mean number of unique nodes identified by each of the centrality measures at each attack iteration of the greedy-multi strategy and for each network. The plot shown is from data gathered when considering the largest network component, but similar results were observed for all four robustness measures. We find a strong relationship to the number of edges. The random network with p = 0.02 maintains an average number of unique nodes above 4 (of 6), whereas the Holme networks with triangle probability 0.50 and 0.75 also maintain a relatively high number of unique nodes per attack. Other networks degrade to a single node being identified. Table 2 presents the average number of times each centrality measure was identified as having the most impact on network robustness while performing a greedy attack, scaled by the number of attacks. The results are averaged over 50 trials and 150 attacks, noting that at any iteration multiple strategies may have the same impact on robustness. All centrality measures often identify the same nodes, and thus as hypothesized in Section 3 the greedy-and random-multi-strategy selection approaches are likely to yield similar results.
C. Elegans
Network Science 
Comparing attack strategies on real-world networks
The results of benchmark tests indicate that random-multi attacks are the most appropriate method an attacker should employ to destroy a network's functionality. However, we only considered networks having an exponential or power law degree distribution. Although these types of networks have been shown to model a large number of real-world phenomena, they are not perfectly representative of the intricacies of every structure. We therefore consider four real-world networks as another context.
The real-world networks we consider are commonly found in literature. The weighted, directed network of C. Elegans was first used in complex network research by [57] . The network has 453 nodes and 2,025 links. We consider the network as undirected and unweighted. The citation network of networks science authors contains 1,589 authors and 2,742 citation connections [58] . A network of the British [59] . The graph contains 2,361 proteins and 6,646 non-self-looping links. Full summary characteristic of each network are given in Table 3 and Fig. 6 presents the networks visually. Figure 7 presents the results of sequential attacks against the four real-world networks, as measured by the four robustness measures. In all cases, random-and greedy-multi-attack tests remove 0.5|V| of the nodes in each respective network. The results largely echo the results found in Section 4, however, a few differences are also present. Notably, for entropy robustness the betweenness and greedy strategies seem to fair poorly on the network science network whereas the random selection of attack strategy performs much better. This highlights that while in most cases the difference between these strategies may be minimal, in some circumstances there may be a significant difference and benefit to using the random approach. In general, however, betweenness and greedy attack strategies yield more desirable results on each graph.
As Table 4 highlights, for the network science problem and entropy robustness the degree, closeness and authority strategies are not deemed highly useful, as they only identify 'useful' nodes with a rate < 0.1. Interestingly, for this particular problem instance poor results were observed in Fig. 4 , and we also now observe an explanation for the observed behaviour as the result of an over-dependence on the betweenness strategy. It seems likely that this is also the result of the greedy strategy being caught in a local optima due to the choice of early attack strategy. 
Versus a defender
Network attacks can be defended by modifying network topology through link addition or rewiring. The intention of the defense is to maintain network functionality, despite loss of a subset of nodes due to attack or random failure. To study the quality of the multi-strategy attacks, we now allow a defender to randomly add k − 1 links to the graph, for k the degree of the last attacked node. So, if a node with degree k is attacked at iteration i, the defender will randomly add k − 1 links to the graph before attack i + 1 occurs. Figure 8 presents the robustness results on the benchmark networks. The consequence of adding links to the graph is apparent in the ability of the strategies to degrade network robustness over the sequence of attacks. Although betweenness centrality qualitatively outperformed all measures when solely attack was considered, it now yields a qualitatively similar outcome to the greedy-and random-multi strategies (Fig. 9) . Networks that are best defended are the random graphs, which lack a structured topology and may contain more than a single initial connected component. In all cases, network destruction slowed when compared with Fig. 4 .
Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we examine the robustness of complex networks to attack by single-and multi-strategy adversaries. Two strategies were considered in the multi-adversary scenario: (1) random choice and (2) greedy choice. The purpose of considering these two strategies is to ascertain whether robustness of networks is significantly better depending on the type of attack at each iteration of the sequential attack. This is useful insight both to attackers of networks (for malicious or benevolent purposes) and for those constructing robust networks. Various exponential and random networks are considered, in addition to varying clustering in scale-free networks. We find little difference between targeted sequential attack by random or greedy adversaries when considering network entropy, efficiency, largest component or pairwise connectivity as robustness measures. Moreover, we find that for the six centrality measures being considered, the betweenness measure often yields superior performance than either the random-or greedy-multi strategies. A defense strategy is also considered whereby the network defender randomly adds k − 1 links after each attach, for k the degree of the last attacked node. We find that for both real-world and benchmark networks the qualitative difference between greedy and random strategies is usually minimal, however, most often a betweenness attack still seems the strongest strategy for network destruction in the contexts considered in this paper.
Future work is focused on determining the number and type of attacks that should occur at each iteration of the sequence in order to have maximum impact on network robustness. Moreover, different types of networks (small-world, tunable assortativity, etc.) may yield different results than those observed here and thus is also an important factor to consider. Generalizing the problem to include node or link cost of attack may be a more realistic scenario, as will permitting links and nodes to be regenerated after a period of time following a successful attack. The final more realistic situation will incorporate the probability of attack success and the choice of strategies to simultaneously utilize at each sequence iteration. In each situation theoretical analyses will be important.
